So far we have looked at specific normative ethical theories (which compete for the answer to the question: “what makes an action morally good, bad, or neither?”), but today we look again at one part of Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics, namely what today is called Virtue Epistemology. The general suggestion is that one big part of human life is that we form beliefs, and our beliefs (about anything) can, and often do, shape what we say or do. So, we need to consider the question: how might being good at forming true beliefs contribute to our answer to the question, “what are your moral obligations?” Today we’ll consider the claim that how we form our beliefs might itself be a moral issue. Perhaps we are morally obliged to form our beliefs in some ways, and not in other ways. After this class, you will:
1. Be able to explain how Virtue Epistemology connects with Virtue Ethics.
2. Understand why forming beliefs in specific ways might be morally bad or morally good.
3. Be able to explain when “minding your evidence” might be a morally good thing for you to do.
Consider the following questions, write your responses in your journal, and talk about them with a friend:
1. What did you think ‘intellectual curiosity’ might be? What does Nathan King add to your understanding of intellectual curiosity? What surprises you?
2. Why should ‘minding your evidence’ matter? Are there any cases in which this is the wrong way to be (or behave)? What exceptions might there be, if any?
3. Be honest with yourself – are you intellectually curious (as described by King)? What set of examples from your own life are evidence on the basis of which you judge that you have this cultivated habit?