We live in a world in which sometimes a person will disbelieve what another person claims only because of irrelevant reasons, such as the other person’s gender, or race, or class, or accent (or some of these together). By contrast, sometimes a person may believe what another person claims only because of irrelevant reasons. Epistemologists call these two phenomena Epistemic Injustice. The specific injustice in both cases has to do with disbelieving, or believing, another’s testimony for no good reason. This specific kind of Epistemic Injustice is called Testimonial Injustice. Unfortunately, there are also other kinds of Epistemic Injustice, such as Hermeneutical Injustice. In today’s class we will discuss these two kinds of Epistemic Injustice, and use these concepts to help us better understand some aspects of race relations. By the end of class, you will:
1. Be able to compare and contrast Testimonial Injustice and Hermeneutical Injustice.
2. Be able to use these concepts from Epistemology to help explain some aspects of race relations in the USA.
3. Begin to think about how you may have been a perpetrator or victim (or both), of one or more of these Epistemic Injustices.
Consider the following questions, write your responses in your journal, and talk about them with a friend:
1. What might it be like to have someone disbelieve you about something important, for no good reason? Why might this not only be a moral issue, but also an epistemic issue?
2. Give an example from your own life where someone believes, or disbelieves, another person for no good reason.
3. What could you do to help yourself and others overcome Testimonial Injustice and Hermeneutical Injustice? Which epistemic virtues might help?